On Davidson’s Master Argument
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47850/RL.2024.5.4.39-51Keywords:
theory of action, reasons for action, causes of action, Davidson’s master argument, causal theory of action, anti-causalism, anomalous monism, explanation, rationalization.Abstract
The article discusses one of Donald Davidson’s arguments in defense of the causal approach, according to which the explanation of actions through reasons is a kind of causal explanation. Davidson insists that the qualification of certain desires and beliefs as reasons is not a sufficient condition for explaining an action. In order to really explain an action, we need to find the reason that became the real efficient cause, since one reason can plausibly explain an action, but at the same time not be its true cause. This thesis of Davidson was called the master argument and is considered in the subsequent tradition as one of the strongest arguments in favor of causalism. The article shows the weaknesses of this argument.
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