Graham Priest on the Contradiction in Kant’s Noumenon

Abstract

Graham Priest in Beyond the Limits of Thought claims that the notion of noumenon in Kant contains a true contradiction consisting in that Kant simultaneously denies the possibility of making judgments concerning noumena and makes nevertheless those judgments. That said, Priest relies on the not merely epistemic, but conceptual inaccessibility of noumena (‘the limit of expression’). However the notions of phenomena, noumena, cognition, transcendental idea and others that he uses are very simple in comparison with those of Kant and often do not allow him to adequately express the subtleties of Kants’ viewpoint. Limitations in the cognition of noumena are connected with the empirical knowledge and do not exclude their knowledge in general, in particular transcendental investigations. At the same time the applicability of the concepts of understanding is not limited by phenomena and Kant in fact applies them beyond the experience when posits objects ‘in idea’. Priest’s simplifications also prevent him from characterizing the peculiar character of transcendental idea in Kant having the form of phenomenon but reducible neither to phenomena, nor noumena. In conclusion, Priest’s thesis about the contradiction in the notion of noumenon in Kant proves to be unfounded.