Zaykova, A. S. In favour of analytic phenomenology of time.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47850/RL.2020.1.2.60-69Keywords:
time perception, time consciousness, temporal structure of consciousness, analytic philosophy, phenomenology, neurophenomenology.Abstract
The article considers analytic phenomenology of time as a most hopeful way for studying temporal structure of consciousness. In order to demonstrate advantage of this area we briefly outline the main methods of research of time consciousness and time perception, clarify connection between analytic philosophy and phenomenology and turn to contemporary research of temporal consciousness structure. We can mention F. Varela, S. Gallagher, E. Pöppel, H. Maturana, E. Knyazeva as proponents of analytic phenomenology, who have already performed outstanding results. Thus, it is through the analytic phenomenology of time we can study temporal structure of consciousness using logical methods, system and analytical approach without excluding phenomenological and neurophenomenological researches.
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