Narrative Transmission of Knowledge
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47850/RL.2024.5.4.12-23Keywords:
narrative, transmission of knowledge, artificial intelligence, reductionism, non-reductionism, non propositional knowledgeAbstract
What kind of knowledge can narratives transmit beyond their explicit propositional content? An extreme reductionist would argue that no additional knowledge is transmitted. A moderate reductionist might suggest that narratives can impart an additional structure to the knowledge, such as emphasizing importance or plausibility. In contrast, a moderate non-reductionist would assert that narratives contain non-explicit propositional content, including causal relationships between events and generalizations. Finally, an extreme non-reductionist would see stories as a means to transmit non-propositional knowledge, most prominently, knowledge of persons and personal perspectives. This categorization aids in understanding which aspects of narrative knowledge could be accessible to artificial intelligence.
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