Ladov on Russell’s Paradox
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47850/RL.2024.5.4.5-11Keywords:
set theoretic paradoxes, Russell’s paradox, self-reference, negationAbstract
In a series of recent publications, V. A. Ladov elaborated a unified treatment of set-theoretic and semantic paradoxes, including Russell’s paradox. His theory includes a unified formalization of paradoxes in question and a description of their necessary and sufficient conditions. His theory is interesting but to my view, some of his concepts are not fully explicated, because of which his description of necessary and sufficient conditions of paradoxes is unclear in some respects. In the present paper, I examine Ladov’s analysis of Russell’s paradox and show the insufficiency in his definition of the concepts of self-referential set and negative property.
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