On Edgington’s Formalization of the Principle of Knowability
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47850/RL.2021.2.4.43-51Keywords:
epistemic logic, the principle of knowability, the Fitch paradox, Edgington, situation semantics, actuality operatorAbstract
The formalization of the principle of knowability suggested by Dorothy Edgington is examined. This formalization has been suggested as a solution to the Fitch problem. It is interesting in that it blocks the Fitch argument and, in informal reading, makes a clear and intuitively appealing sense. On the other hand, as is shown in the paper, the semantic theory behind this formalization has two significant gaps: 1) it does not define the interpretation of actuality operator, and 2) it does not define the semantic way of representing the agent’s knowledge. The main outcome of the papers is critical. It is to the effect that unless those gaps are filled, Edgington’s theory cannot count as a solution to the Fitch problem.
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